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Pardons and the Theory of the “Second Best” 
Chad Flanders* 
 
This paper explains and defends a “second best” theory of pardons. Pardons are 
“second
-   
-best” in two ways.  First, pardons are second-best because they represent, in part, a 
failure of justice: the person convicted was not actually guilty, or he or she was punished too 
harshly, or the punishment no longer fits the crime.  In the familiar analogy, pardons act as a 
“safety valve” on a criminal justice system that doesn’t work as, ideally, it should.  Pardons, in 
the non-ideal world we live in, are sometimes necessary. 
            But pardons are also “second-best” in another way, because they can represent 
deviations from certain other values we hold dear in the criminal law: fairness, consistency, and 
non-arbitrariness.  Pardons, when they are given, can all too often reflect patterns of racial bias, 
favoritism, and sheer randomness, both when they are given too generously or not generously 
enough.  So we need to have a theory of how the pardoning power should be used, even when it 
is used to correct what are obvious injustices in the criminal justice system. 
 This paper both takes up the task both of showing how pardons are justified, but more 
importantly, also gives a theory on when they should be used.  It introduces two constraints on 
the pardon power, one which constrains pardons when considered individually, and another 
which constrains pardons when we consider them as a whole.  It is this latter ground that has 
been left mostly underdeveloped in the literature: we seem to know that pardons when given en 
masse can be controversial, but we lack adequate terms to explain why they might be morally 
problematic.  This paper fills that gap in the literature, and in the process provides a general 
framework for analyzing when various “second-best” moves are permissible in reforming and 
correcting injustices in the application of the criminal law. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 In January 2012, near the end of his term of office, Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour 
gave some form of executive clemency (pardon, early release, or suspension of sentences) to 
nearly two hundred people.1  The move was nearly unprecedented in Mississippi,2 although it 
was later upheld by the Mississippi Supreme Court against a procedural challenge.3  The 
“pardons” – as I shall collectively call them, following most reporters -- were, and properly 
remain, intensely controversial.4   There was ample evidence that Barbour had “played favorites” 
in handing out the pardons.  Some of those pardoned had personal connections to the Governor 
though the controversial Mississippi’s “trusty” program;5  others Barbour pardoned were 
                                                          
1 Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour Pardons Nearly 200 People, Including Convicted Killers, CRIMESIDER (Jan. 
11, 2012) available at  http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57357252-504083/mississippi-gov-haley-
barbour-pardons-nearly-200-including-convicted-killers/; Richard Fausset, Outgoing Gov. Haley Barbour’s Pardons 
Shock Mississippi, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2012) available at  http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/12/nation/la-na-
barbour-pardons-20120113.   
2 See Haley Barbour’s Shocking Pardon Spree: A Guide, THE WEEK (Jan. 13, 2012) available at 
http://theweek.com/article/index/223306/haley-barbours-shocking-pardon-spree-a-guide (previous pardon high for a 
Mississippi Governor was 13).   
3 See Holbrook Mohr, Haley Barbour Pardons: Mississippi Supreme Court Rules Pardons are Valid, HUFF. POST 
(Mar. 8, 2012) available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/08/haley-barbour-pardons-mississippi-supreme-
court_n_1332769.html; In re Hooker, 87 So.3d 401 (Miss. 2012) (“[W]e are compelled to hold that—in each of the 
cases before us—it fell to the governor alone to decide whether the Constitution's publication requirement was 
met.”).   
4 Fausset, supra note 1 (“The actions have brought criticism from victims' families, everyday Mississippians like 
[local resident Terrance] Winters, and Democratic officials including Jim Hood, the state attorney general, who 
persuaded a judge to put some of the pardons on hold.”). 
5 “Trusties” were convicts who worked for the Governor, at his mansion, doing routine maintenance and 
landscaping.  The program has since been abolished by Barbour’s successor.  Jessica Bakeman, Miss. Governor 
Ends Controversial Mansion Trusty Program, USA TODAY (Jan. 20, 2012) available at 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-01-20/mississippi/52694334/1.  Barbour pardoned five 
people with life sentences – including four murderers -- who had worked in the trusty program during his 
administration.  See Rich Phillips, Controversy Puts Mississippi’s Longstanding “Trusty” Program in Spotlight, 
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“members of prominent Mississippi families, major Republican donors or others from the higher 
social strata of Mississippi life.”6  One individual pardoned was the cousin of football great Brett 
Favre, who had been convicted of killing a friend in a drinking-and-driving accident.7  Taken as 
a whole, the pardons also showed a disturbing racial distribution.  Nearly two-thirds of the 
pardons during Barbour’s tenure were to whites, even though the majority of those convicted of 
crimes in Mississippi are black.8   
In his public statements, Barbour gave only a vague theological justification for his mass 
pardons, saying that Christians believe people can be redeemed and deserve a second chance.9  
He added that pardon board had recommended many, if not all, of those pardoned for executive 
clemency.10   In an op-ed written later, Barbour defended the tradition of pardoning trusties, and 
asserting that those who commit crimes of passion such as murder are least likely to re-offend 
and so are no longer a danger to society.11  Four of the trusties Barbour pardoned had been 
convicted of murder.12 
 Such dramatic exercises of the pardon power such as Barbour’s raise deep and troubling 
questions, not only about the pardons taken individually, but also about the justifiability of the 
pardon power as a whole.  When a governor pardons (an individual or a large group), he or she is 
making an exception to the laws that apply to everybody.13  Even pardons that look justifiable on 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
CNN.COM (Jan. 18, 2012) available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/16/justice/mississippi-trusty-
program/index.html.     
6 Campbell Robertson & Stephanie Saul, List of Pardons Included Many Tied to Power, NY TIMES A1 (Jan. 28, 
2012).  
7 Judy Keen, Barbour’s Pardons Stir Outrage in Mississippi, USA TODAY (Jan. 13, 2012) available at 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-01-12/mississippi-barbour-pardons/52511486/1 (“Among 
those pardoned was Earnest Scott Favre, brother of former NFL quarterback Brett Favre. He pleaded guilty to 
driving in front of a train while drunk in 1996, resulting in the death of his best friend.”).   
8 Patrik Jonsson, Haley Barbour Pardons: Why Were the Forgiven So Disproportionately White? C.S. MONITOR 
(Jan. 21, 2012) available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0121/Haley-Barbour-pardons-Why-were-the-
forgiven-so-disproportionately-white (“Out of a total of 222 acts of clemency given by Barbour during his tenure …  
two-thirds benefited white prisoners. Meanwhile, two-thirds of the state's prison population is black.”); see also 
Robertson & Saul, supra note 6, at A1 (“Yet in a state with the highest poverty rate in the nation, where nearly 70 
percent of convicts are black, official redemption appears to have been attained disproportionately by white people 
and the well connected.”).   
9 “Christianity teaches us forgiveness and second chances. I believe in second chances, and I try hard to be 
forgiving. The historic power of gubernatorial clemency by the Governor to pardon felons is rooted in the Christian 
idea of giving second chances. I’m not saying I’ll be perfect, that no one who received clemency will ever do 
anything wrong. I’m not infallible, and no one else is. But I’m very comfortable and totally at peace with these 
pardons, especially of the Mansion inmates.”  Haley Barbour, Statement on Clemency (Jan. 22, 2013) available at  
http://www.governorbarbour.com/news/2011/dec/1.13barbourclemencystatement.html. 
10 Id. (“My decision about clemency was based upon the recommendation of the parole board in more than 90% of 
the cases.”) 
11 Haley Barbour, Why I Released 26 Prisoners, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2012) available at 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-01-18/opinions/35439863_1_inmates-clemency-trusties. 
12 Haley Barbour Pardons 4 Killers: Convicts Were Trusties at Governor’s Mansion, THE GRIO (JAN. 10, 2012) 
available at http://thegrio.com/2012/01/10/haley-barbour-pardons-4-killers-convicts-were-trustees-at-miss-
governor-mansion/. 
13 Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1453 (2004) (arguing against executive discretion to reduce 
or remove sentences on retributivist grounds); KATHLEEN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 28 (1997) (summarizing Kant’s opposition to pardons, given that rulers have a “categorical to punish 
those who have committed crimes”).   
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their face, because the prisoner has suffered enough or because the governor deems a sentence 
against an individual to be too long or too harsh, violate the governor’s duty to be an impartial 
administrator of the law.14  Taken to an extreme, this argument would even limit an executive’s 
ability to pardon in an error correcting capacity (say, if someone were actually innocent), 
provided that the correct procedures had been used.15 
 Barbour’s pardons also came at an inconvenient time: when there have been increasing 
calls for executives – including and perhaps especially the President16 – to increase the number 
of pardons granted.17   The pardon power has fallen in to disuse, perhaps in overreaction to 
certain manifestly political uses of the pardon, such as President Clinton’s infamous pardon of 
Marc Rich.18  But Barbour’s pardons seem to show, in an elaborate and troubling fashion, how 
mass pardons can go very wrong and would seem to condone, if not justify, executive hesitancy, 
delay, and general over-caution in pardoning.19     
 In this Article, I defend the pardoning power (especially against those who would find the 
power itself always and everywhere unjustifiable) while finding that there are and should be 
strong moral limits to when and how it can be used.  To see how the pardon power could be 
justified (and, as a result, individual instances of pardoning), we need to make a distinction 
between ideal and non-ideal circumstances, a distinction I borrow and modify from the work of 
John Rawls,20 and one closely related to the idea of the “second best.”21   
In ideal or near ideal circumstances, as I will be using the concepts, sentences are for the 
most part just, and the criminal justice system works by and large in a fair manner.  In a perfectly 
ideal society, there would be virtually no need for pardons.  But in non-ideal circumstances, 
                                                          
14 For an excellent statement of the tension between mercy (including pardons) and the rule of law norms of the 
administrative state, see Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 
HARVARD L. REV. 1332 (2008) (“[T]he rise of the administrative state has made unchecked discretion an anomaly in 
the law, and a phenomenon to be viewed with suspicion. The expansion of the administrative state has showcased 
the dangers associated with the exercise of discretion.”); see also id. at 1333n. 5 (collecting sources on the tension 
between mercy and justice). 
15 See  William Baude, Last Chance on Death Row, 34 THE WILSON QUARTERLY 18 (Autumn 2010) (defending 
value of finality in criminal proceedings with application to the Troy Davis case).     
16 See Dafna Linzer, Obama Has Granted Clemency More Rarely Than Any Modern President, ProPublica  (Nov. 2, 
2012), available at http://www.propublica.org/article/obama-has-granted-clemency-more-rarely-than-any-modern-
president (news story on infrequent use of pardons by President Obama).   
17 See Clara H. Drinan, Clemency in a Time of Crisis,  28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1123 (2012) (arguing for greater use of 
pardon power);  Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. OF CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 
1169, (2010) (“[P]ardon has important uses in the federal justice system, and recent experience has shown that a 
president who fails to pardon regularly throughout his term will have difficulty dealing with pent-up demand at its 
conclusion.”); Rachel E. Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency, 21 FED. SENT. REP. 153 
(Feb. 2009) (calling for a “return to an era in which clemency is a key part of a functioning system of justice”).  See 
generally P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Pardon Power, http://www.pardonpower.com/.     
18 Jessica Reeves, The Marc Rich Case: A Primer, TIME (Feb. 13, 2001) (details of controversial pardon of Marc 
Rich).   
19 See Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness, supra note 17, at 157 (noting political risks of pardoning).   
20 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1972).   
21 Lawrence Solum, Second Best and Nonideal Theory (May 17, 2005) available at 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/05/legal-theory-lexicon-second-best-nonideal-theory.html (“Despite its 
technical origins, the idea behind the second best is very general: sometimes the ideal solution to a problem [or 
“optimal policy option”] is infeasible. The best should not be the enemy of the good; so, when the first-best policy 
option is unavailable, then normative legal theorists should consider second-best solutions.”) 
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sentences tend to be overly long and harsh or cruel, and the criminal justice system is biased 
against certain groups.  I think it fairly obvious that we (in America, and perhaps other parts of 
the world22) exist in non-ideal circumstances.23  In such a context, pardons can be justified as 
ways to more perfectly approximate what criminal justice would be like in ideal circumstances: 
by limiting unjust sentences, say, or by removing unjustified post-conviction disabilities.  This, 
indeed, is how pardons are commonly justified in the literature.24 
 This, however, does not end the enquiry, but only begins it.  For it leaves open the 
questions that there may be limitations on how the pardoning power can justly operate, even in 
non-ideal conditions.  For even non-ideal theory operates under some constraints, constraints on 
how far we can relax certain moral absolutes so as to more perfectly approximate ideal justice.25 
If pardons are applied in a reckless and morally arbitrary manner, this may be impermissible, 
even under non-ideal theory.  This raises the interesting possibility that the way Haley Barbour 
pardoned in general is unjustifiable, even if some (or all) of his individual pardons were fully 
justified.  It shows the possibility that not pardoning at all could be better in some cases than 
pardoning in a discriminatory, biased, or random manner.       
 My paper seeks to define a consensus in some areas of the criminal law but to unsettle it 
in others.  In defending pardons, I present a theory that tries to provide a minimal account of the 
pardon power which should be unobjectionable, or nearly unobjectionable, to most scholars of 
the criminal law.  Here I do not mean to court controversy, and I defend pardons on the 
narrowest of grounds: as necessary to secure justice in particular cases and not as grand acts of 
mercy.  But in finding that pardons may be distributed in ways that are morally arbitrary, I open 
up a new avenue for criticizing pardons -- as violations of equal treatment -- one which has been 
previously underdeveloped in the literature.26  Lastly, I join the chorus of voices that urge reform 
of the criminal law and criminal punishment, but show that there are good reasons to think that 
some reforms even when motivated by a desire for justice may themselves be morally 
problematic.   
 My paper proceeds in three parts. 
                                                          
22 The United States has the highest prison population in the world, with China a distant second.  See World Prison 
Populations, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/uk/06/prisons/html/nn2page1.stm. 
23 See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011) (crisis of mass 
incarceration in America); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (same); Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America, NEW YORKER (Jan. 30, 2012) available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2012/01/30/120130crat_atlarge_gopnik (same).      
24 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 14, at 1354n. 44 (collecting uses of the “safety valve” justification for pardons); 
George Lardner & Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences and Presidential Mercy: The Role of Judges in 
Pardon Cases 1790-1850, 16 FED. SENT. R. 212 (Feb. 1, 2004) (importance of having a “safety valve” in system of 
mandatory punishments).    
25 RAWLS, supra note 20, at 246 (“Existing institutions are to be judged in the light of [the ideal] conception and 
held to be unjust to the extent that they depart from it without sufficient reason.”) 
26 Some have dealt with the problem of biased pardons, although they take a slightly different focus than I do.  
Elizabeth Rappaport, Staying Alive: Executive Clemency, Equal Protection and the Politics of Gender in Women’s 
Capital Cases, 4 BUFF. L. REV. 967 (2007) (suggesting a possible positive role for biased pardons, based on a theory 
of “exemplary” pardons); Mark Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power, 41 BRANDEIS  L. J. 81, 117-124 (2002) 
(possible Constitutional constraints on pardons based on gender or race).    
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 In the first Part, I examine a prominent theory of the pardoning power, that given by 
Karen Moore in her important book, Pardons and in a related article.27  Moore defends a narrow 
view of pardons, which sees them as justified only when they are necessary to correct an 
injustice in the administration of the criminal law.  I find this view plausible, and in the second 
part, I sympathetically present it.  I also show that, surprisingly, that under Moore’s theory many, 
if not all, of Haley Barbour’s pardons might have been justified.   
 In the second and longest Part, I examine the possibility that even though many of 
Barbour’s pardons might be able to be justified individually, there may nonetheless be something 
wrong with his pardons taken as a whole.  Moore supports pardons as justifiable when done in 
the light of an injustice in an individual case, given that our criminal justice system as it exists is 
not fully just.  But Haley Barbour’s pardons show that even pardons that correct individual 
injustices in the status quo may still be, on another level, unjustified.  This happens when 
pardons are done in the wrong way, including when they are distributed in a morally 
discriminatory, or morally arbitrary, manner.28  This is the case, I believe, with Haley Barbour’s 
pardons, and possibly with the pardons in the second Bush administration. 
 In the third Part, I extend the analysis of Barbour’s pardons into a larger point about 
reforming the criminal justice system in non-ideal circumstances.   There are constraints on 
giving pardons that go beyond having them be based on good and sufficient reasons, constraints 
that go to the proper distribution and implementation of pardons, and not just the fact that 
pardons must be given for good and sufficient reasons.  These types of constraints are constraints 
on how reform in the criminal justice system can happen: even when we pursue just ends, such as 
when we pardon those who have been sentenced unjustly, we must pursue them within some 
limits.   
I also present important qualifications to my thesis.  Most importantly, my paper should 
not be taken to promote the restrictive use of the pardon power.  Rather, my point is simply this: 
even if we should pardon more (and I think we should) there are, importantly, better and worse 
ways of pardoning many people.   
 Throughout my essay, I used Barbour’s pardons as exemplary of a problem with 
dispensing pardons on arbitrary or immoral grounds, where the pardons on a case by case basis 
may be justified, but when taken as a whole, a troubling pattern emerges.  Recent research into 
the use of presidential pardons shows them also to be made on an arbitrary or possibly 
discriminatory basis,29 so the problem is not an isolated one.  It shows a danger in the pardon 
power in general, and points to the pressing need to develop more elaborate standards for the 
proper use of that power.30   
                                                          
27 KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1989); Kathleen D. Moore, 
Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 281 (1993). 
28 This has obvious implications for the debate on “comparative desert.”  See e.g.,  Ronen Avraham & Daniel 
Statman, More on the Comparative Nature of Desert: Can a Deserved Punishment Be Just? (ms, Sep. 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2146749.   
29 See especially the excellent ebook produced by ProPublica, DAFNA LINZER & JENNIFER LAFLEUR, PRESIDENTIAL 
PARDONS: SHADES OF MERCY (2012); see also Editorial, The Quality of Mercy, Strained , New York Times, Jan. 
15, 2013, at , available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/opinion/sunday/the-quality-of-mercy-strained.html 
(possible racial bias in Presidential pardons). 
30 See also the recent pardoning controversy in South Korea.  Choe Sang-Hun, Departing South Korean Leader 
Creates Furor With Pardons, NY TIMES A8 (Jan. 29, 2013) (“With less than one month left in office, the departing 
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II.   A Defense of the Pardoning Power 
 
 The pardon power has long been controversial in itself, and not only the occasions of its 
use.31  I sketch out below, briefly, one influential understanding of when pardons are and are not 
justified given by Karen Moore in her book an in an important later article.  Moore defends 
pardons narrowly, as necessary to correct serious injustices in the legal system.   Moore’s view 
of the pardon power is strict, and on some accounts might not amount to a theory of executive 
“mercy” at all, if by “mercy” we mean judgments based on whim or caprice or compassion 
rather than based on reasons.32    
Moore defends pardoning, then, but she does not defend the pardon as an unfettered right 
of the executive to forgive crimes, a gift that falls on those the sovereign happens to favor (the 
traditional view which was arguably in the background of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s 
ruling upholding Barbour’s pardons33).  Rather, the executive must pardon only for “good and 
sufficient reasons,” reasons relating to the offender’s culpability, and to the proportionality of the 
offender’s punishment.   A pardon cannot be given simply because the executive wants to give 
it.34  It must be morally justified.    
 While we might think that Barbour’s pardons could only be defended on the traditional 
view (where the sovereign has an absolute right to pardon), I show in this part that they might 
also in principle be defended under Moore’s view.  For it could turn out that Barbour had, in 
Moore’s terms, “good and sufficient reasons” to pardon each offender: one offender’s sentence 
might have been too harsh, for instance, or another offender might have been wrongly convicted.  
To see whether they were justified, we would need to examine each case separately, on its own 
merits.  
   
A.   Moore’s Theory of Pardons 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
president of South Korea, Lee Myung-bak, granted special pardons on Tuesday to political allies, a longtime friend 
and dozens of others who have been convicted of corruption and other crimes.”) 
31 See generally, Markel, supra note 13. 
32 See Markel, supra note 13, at 1436 for a definition of mercy along these lines (“Mercy I define first as the 
remission of deserved punishment, in part of in whole, to criminal offenders on the basis of characteristics that 
evoke compassion or sympathy but that are morally unrelated to the offender’s competence and ability to choose to 
engage in criminal conduct.”).  Markel would more likely categorize Moore’s defense of pardons as a defense of 
“equitable discretion.”    Id. at 1440.  
33 The Mississippi Supreme Court’s ruling was made on narrow, separation of powers grounds, but the idea that the 
executive’s decision was unreviewable by any other branch certainly suggests a power that is accountable to no 
other body.  One of the dissenters was more explicit about the roots of the pardon power.  See In re Hooker, at ¶ 141 
(Pierce, J., dissenting) (“[T]he power to pardon … is an act of the sovereign’s ‘mercy and grace.’”) See also Moore, 
Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 282 (“The pardoning power of the great monarchs of 
seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe was analogous in theory and practice to divine grace. Like grace, the 
freely given, unearned gift of divine favor, a royal pardon was thought of as a personal gift. Therefore, it required no 
justification and was not subject to criticism”) 
34 Kathleen D. Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27. 
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 Moore, in her book, and in an important follow-up article,35 defends the pardoning power 
as an extension of retributive justice,36 although I (as I explain) do not believe adopting her 
theory means adopting retributivism tout court.37  Retributive justice, on her view, means 
punishing offenders because they deserve it.  But in an imperfect system of criminal justice, 
offenders may not always get what they morally or legally deserve, and so need to be pardoned, 
either by being released or by having their sentences reduced.   As Moore writes, “A pardon is 
justified when the procedures miscarry, giving the state a legal, but not a moral, license to 
punish.”38     
What exactly, “procedures miscarry” means here is ambiguous, and Moore does not 
exactly clarify in her article (her book employs different concepts), and so I do not pretend to be 
strictly following her here.39  For procedures can miscarry in a strictly legal sense, where a judge 
misapplies the sentencing guidelines, say, and gives an offender a higher sentence than is legally 
allowable.  This would presumably be grounds for reversal by an appellate court, but could also 
presumably be the basis for a pardon “for good and sufficient reasons,” if all avenues for appeal 
have been exhausted.  Here the procedures that have miscarried can be deemed to have done so 
using only legal standards, that is, standards that are internal to the legal system itself.  In other 
words, in cases like these, the legal system has not performed their functions correctly.40   
 But procedures might miscarry in other ways, not because they are not followed, but 
because when they are followed they lead to the morally wrong result.  An innocent person may 
be convicted even though all the proper legal procedures have been followed.  This happens, and 
there may be no legal error we can directly point to.41   
Suppose, for instance, that the evidence that exists at the time of the trial leads a jury to 
convict someone of a crime.42  Every appellate court also subsequently upholds the conviction.  
Nonetheless, many years after the trial, new evidence comes to light that clearly exculpates the 
convicted person, his available legal avenues for appeal now thoroughly exhausted.  Here the 
procedures have nonetheless miscarried, not in the sense they were not followed, but because 
they led to the wrong result.  From a point of view external to those legal procedures, we can see 
that something has gone wrong, even though in a strictly legal sense, nothing has.43   
In this case, nonetheless, a pardon is justified, because the reason for the legal procedures 
is to protect the innocent.  But those procedures have not done this.  To prevent a (morally, but 
not legally) innocent person from being punished is a “good and sufficient reason” to pardon, 
says Moore.   
                                                          
35 MOORE, PARDONS, supra note 27; Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27. 
36 MOORE, PARDONS, supra note 27, Part II (“A Retributivist Theory of Pardons”).   
37 See infra note 46. 
38 Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 286. 
39 In particular, I believe that there are cases when the state does in fact lack a legal basis for punishment, and where 
a pardon is therefore justified.  I give an example of this shortly in the text.     
 40More precisely, the actors in the legal system may have failed to perform their functions correctly.   
41 See Baude, Last Chance on Death Row, supra note 15.   
42 I borrow this example from Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 286. 
43 As a result, we can imagine a theory of pardons that justifies them only in cases of strict legal error (the rules have 
not been followed correctly), but not in cases of moral error (where the procedures have been followed, but the 
result is morally wrong). 
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 Or more controversially, suppose that a sentence handed down, while perfectly legal, is 
nonetheless, by some recognizable moral standard, too harsh or unfair.44  If this is the case, 
although the state may legally punish that person a certain term of years, it has no moral basis to 
do so.  That person may have his sentence permissibly reduced by an act of executive mercy, 
according to Moore.45  How to decide when a sentence is too harsh is a complicated question, 
which Moore does not attempt to answer (nor will I attempt to do so at any length, here).46  But 
we might intuitively agree that some sentences, in principle, might be too harsh for an offender 
given his crime, or given other factors.  In those cases, the executive has a “good and sufficient 
reason” to reduce the sentence, or to end it altogether.     
In general, says Moore, “pardons should be used as part of a broader constitutional 
scheme to ensure that sentences are assigned justly.”47  This can happen when the legal 
procedures miscarry in an obvious way (the judge who has misapplied sentencing guidelines), or 
in a less obvious way: when the punishment is not consistent with the values that underlie the 
criminal justice system as a whole, of protecting innocence, or of assigning punishments that are 
proportional to the offense.  “Procedures miscarry” when the legal system does not follow its 
own rules, or when they do not lead to results that are consistent with the values implicit in its 
procedures, such as fairness or avoiding cruel and unusual punishments.  The pardoning power is 
used for “good and sufficient reasons,” in short, when it upholds the values that are at the basis 
of a just constitutional scheme.     
 
B.  An Objection Briefly Considered 
 
This, again, is not the place to present a fully worked out theory of pardons; here, I mean 
to borrow Moore’s theory, for the most part, in order to test the question of whether even if 
pardons taken individually might be for good and sufficient reasons, they might be unjust when 
taken as a whole.  This will be my main contribution to the debate over pardons, and I pursue it 
in Part II.  But here I want to consider an objection to Moore’s theory that will help us flesh it out 
a bit. 
That objection is that Moore’s theory is not really a theory of pardons at all.   A theory of 
pardons, the objection goes, should specify those places where the executive can permissibly 
exercise mercy.  But the above cases show no such thing; rather, they show cases where the 
                                                          
44 George W. Bush’s pardon of Scooter Libby was arguably of this sort.  See Michael Lindenberger, The Quality of 
Mercy: Don’t Jump on Haley Barbour All at Once, TIME (Jan. 17, 2012) available at 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2104577,00.html (“Presidents have also commuted sentences they 
feel are too harsh without removing the taint of the conviction. President George W. Bush did just that when he 
commuted the sentence of Scooter Libby, Dick Cheney's former chief of staff. ‘I respect the jury's verdict,’ Bush 
said at the time. ‘But I have concluded that the prison sentence given to Mr. Libby is excessive. Therefore, I am 
commuting the portion of Mr. Libby's sentence that required him to spend 30 months in prison.’”).   
45 Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 287. 
46 Moore defines harshness in retributive terms, as being a sentence that exceeds the offender’s desert.   MOORE, 
PARDONS, supra note 27, at 93, 97-98.   But one could also imagine it being defined in other theoretical terms: a 
harsh sentence could be one that no longer had any utilitarian point (it didn’t deter other offenders, or rehabilitate the 
offender), or that caused too much suffering.  On this last point, see the illuminating remarks in David Gray, 
Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1691-92 (2010).   
47 Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 286. 
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executive must act, so that he or she is morally required to stop the injustice.  Moore’s theory of 
pardons makes pardons mandatory and not permissible.48 
But I do not see it as an objection to a theory of pardons that it diagnoses at least some 
acts of pardon as morally mandatory.  Indeed, there are certain cases, I think, where Presidents or 
Governors are morally required from stopping a grave injustice from being done.  It would be a 
flaw in a theory if it could not identify these instances.  A pardon that a Governor is morally 
required to give -- say of a person who is actually innocent of his crime -- is not any less a 
pardon for that. 
We might worry, still, that on Moore’s theory, there are only mandatory acts of 
pardoning, that there is no place for discretion on whom or when to pardon.  Even if this is so, 
this may not be a decisive objection to it being a theory of pardons (in short, I do not think that 
pardons must contain only permissible acts49).  But there is still something we can say to this.  
First, it will usually be a fuzzy matter what punishment it is, exactly, that an offender deserves.   
Does every offender who commits a wrong deserve to be arrested, to be prosecuted, to be given 
this sentence, and no other?  Always?  I do not think we can give any determinate answer to 
these questions.50  When an executive decides that a person’s sentence is more than he deserves, 
he is acting with some discretion, in the same way that many other actors in the process have 
acted with discretion.  When the executive makes this decision, he may not be morally obligated 
to act in a certain way (to pardon or not to pardon); there may simply be no fact of the matter as 
to what the offender deserves in this case. 
Indeed, the executive has a certain advantage in the process, because he comes at a later 
stage: he or she can see how the offender has responded to the punishment, whether conditions 
have changed so that the offender no longer deserves the original punishment, or has reformed 
him- or herself.51  No matter which overarching theory of punishment we believe in, the 
executive has more information about whether those purposes are being accomplished, or 
accomplished in a fair way.52  The governor, say, can see if the punishment is still useful, or just, 
                                                          
48 Antony Duff makes a version of this point in his review of Moore’s book.  See Antony Duff, Review Essay/Justice, 
Mercy, Forgiveness, 9 CRIM. JUSTICE ETHICS 61 (1990) (arguing that, in some cases, Moore’s theory renders 
pardons “necessary or obligatory, not merely permissible.”).   
49 This may be the place to again emphasize that I am interested in pardoning not in mercy.  Mercy may necessarily 
be a discretionary act, tied to any reason or no reason at all, and be something that “someone has neither a natural 
nor a legal right to claim—it is bestowed on the offender—perhaps like some understandings of grace.”  Markel, 
Against Mercy, supra note 13, at 2004.  This may be true of mercy, but it does not seem to me to be true of pardons.  
In some cases, a person may have a right to a pardon (because, for example, she he innocent, and cannot achieve 
vindication in any other way but an executive pardon).   For a similar distinction (between mercy and equity) see 
Stephen P. Garvey, Is it Wrong To Commute Death Row? Retribution, Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319 
(2004).   
50 I make this point about the indeterminacy of desert at length in another paper, How Retribution Fails (manuscript 
on file with author).   See also  the excellent paper by Alice Ristroph on the same point: Desert, Democracy, and 
Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293 (2006). 
51 See Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Operation of Executive Clemency, 74 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1501 (2000).   
52 Even on a retributive theory, it seems incorrect to say that we can learn nothing about an offender’s act after he 
had committed it: we may learn about his culpability, or his character, only later.  The idea that we have perfect 
knowledge of offender’s competence or ability to choose at the time of trial seems to me a fallacy.   Of course, new 
evidence can be found after a trial is concluded, which would also give obvious grounds, on retributive theory, for 
changing or removing the sentence.   
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or deserved.  There is still an enormous space for judgment here; as I said, I doubt there is a clear 
answer to the question of who deserves clemency and who does not.  So even on Moore’s theory, 
there is room for saying that some pardons are permissible, and some are mandatory.   
 
C.  Justifying Haley Barbour’s Pardons 
 
 I want to withhold any further objections to Moore’s view, for the time being, although I 
should be clear that I find her account rather persuasive.  If there are flawed moral or legal 
judgments in the criminal justice system, a pardon is one way that those judgments can be 
corrected, and corrected in the name of the values of the legal system itself.  The question I want 
to deal with now is this: can such a narrow view of pardons justify Haley Barbour’s pardons, or 
does it instead show why they may be illegitimate? 
 The answer to this question is, I think, rather straightforward on Moore’s view, although 
perhaps in other respects unsatisfying: we can only tell if we look at the pardons one at a time, 
and see if they are supported by “good and sufficient reasons,” in Moore’s phrase.53  If some 
sentences were incorrectly imposed, then Barbour was right to pardon those who received those 
sentences.  If some other legal, procedural rule were not followed, then that case, too, would be 
eligible for a pardon.   In short, the analysis under Moore’s theory is individualistic, rather than 
holistic.54  We don’t have to look to any other pardon to see whether a pardon in an individual 
case was justified or not.  
 It is unlikely that there were many such “legalistic” pardons granted by Barbour; indeed 
if there were any at all; Barbour would have wanted to draw attention to these pardons.  More 
probable is that Barbour gave many “moralistic” pardons.  Some, Barbour may have rightly 
believed, had suffered enough from their punishments, or faced collateral consequences from 
their punishment that were no longer warranted (if they ever were).  Certainly this could have 
been the case for those who were given early release for medical reasons (although Barbour 
defended these pardons, rather cynically, in terms of saving the state money55).   
In particular, Barbour may have felt that others had been given too long sentences, even 
if those sentences were legally and properly arrived at under the criminal code of Mississippi.  
For example, the summer before his departure from office, Barbour commuted the sentences of 
two African-American women who were sentenced to life for an armed robbery that netted a 
total of eleven dollars.56  In the case of Earnest Scott Farve, (the relative of Brett Farve), Farve 
                                                          
53 As some of the early news reports conceded.   
54  For a related, but more technical use of these terms see Thomas Hurka, Desert: Holistic and Individualistic, 
manuscript available at http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~thurka/docs/desert_hi_rev.pdf (distinguishing between 
desert in an individual case and desert across cases, and calling the later way of looking at desert “holistic”).   
55 Barbour, supra note 9 (“Half of the people who were incarcerated and released were placed on indefinite 
suspension due to medical reasons because their health care expenses while incarcerated were costing the state so 
much money. These individuals suffer from severe chronic illnesses, are on dialysis, in wheelchairs or are 
bedridden.”)  Barbour did go on to say that these people no longer represented threats to society.   
56 Patrik Jonsson, Did Haley Barbour’s Pardon Spree Go Too Far? C.S. MONITOR (Jan. 11, 2012) (“Last summer, 
Barbour was hailed by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People as a “shining example” for 
commuting the life sentences of two African-American women who had spent 16 years in prison for an armed 
robbery that yielded $11.”).   
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was originally sentenced to one year house arrest for his crime, but had that increased to a 
suspended fifteen year sentence “after he left his house to go fishing.”57  In these three cases, 
Barbour (we can guess) thought that the resulting sentences were simply too harsh, and so a 
pardon was warranted.    
More compelling still, Barbour may have believed that some suffered from the stigma of 
their criminal conviction, and that this was too much: they had, in his view, suffered enough 
from their crimes.  They deserved the right to be able to apply for a job without the stigma of a 
past felony conviction, or to reclaim their right to vote, or to hunt.58  Indeed Barbour made this 
last point explicit in his remarks defending his pardon.59  Especially if we believe such things as 
felony disenfranchisement are per se unjust and immoral as punishments,60 a pardon designed to 
negate this feature of Mississippi sentences would seem to be one that is done for good and 
sufficient reasons.      
 In short, I find it hard to argue against the supposition that at least some of Barbour’s 
pardons were justified under Moore’s analysis.  Probably at least of the sentences were cases 
where the state had a narrow legal right to punish, but the punishments were in fact morally 
unjustified.  Barbour, on Moore’s view had the power to pardon in these cases.  Some of the 
cases, though, were probably not cases of pardons for good and sufficient reasons: they were 
based on ties of friendship, or because of lobbying, or some other non-morally salient reason.  
They could not be based on good and sufficient reasons.   
 Suppose, then (even if counterfactually), that all of Barbour’s pardons were done for 
“good and sufficient” reasons.  We would have to tell and long and detailed story about how this 
was so.  We would have to say which punishments were too long, or who (if anyone) was 
wrongly convicted.  We might have to tell a story about how some punishments, such as the 
taking away the right to vote for convicted felons, are never permissible, so that removing those 
punishments via an act of clemency, would be justified.   If we could tell a story that gave a good 
and sufficient reason for each of Barbour’s pardons (and again, I doubt that we could), then there 
would be no objection to them, at least on Moore’s view. 
 But I want to register a sense of uneasiness about this conclusion, a sense that goes 
beyond the suspicion that not all of Barbour’s pardons could be individually justified.  My 
argument in the remainder of the paper will be that, even if all of the pardons granted were done 
for good and sufficient reasons, there can be problems with a Governor’s pardons taken as a 
whole.  That is, we have to analyze the justifiability of pardons on two levels: first, on the level 
of the individual pardon; and second, on the level of all the pardons granted by an executive.  
                                                          
57 Id.   
58 See, on this score, the op-ed by Molly M. Gill, Why Did Governor Haley Barbour’s Pardons Cause Such a 
Backlash? HUFF. POST (Jan. 19, 2012) available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/molly-m-gill/haley-barbour-
pardons_b_1217237.html (“What is it about former Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour's pardons that irk us so 
much?  It can't be because 189 people who were already out of prison and obeying the law will have better job 
prospects and restored civil rights because he pardoned them.”) 
59 “The pardons were intended to allow them to find gainful employment or acquire professional licenses as well as 
hunt and vote.”   Barbour, supra note 9. 
60 See Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over Felon 
Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2004) (discussing the Constitutionality and morality of laws 
disenfranchising felons).    
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There can be objections to the pardoning power that appear only, or at least most clearly, on the 
wholesale level.  It is to these objections that I now turn. 
 
III.   Problems with Pardons En Masse 
 
 The general thrust of Moore’s view on pardons is this: there can be flaws in the system of 
criminal justice that lead to results that are not consistent with the underlying (for Moore, 
retributive) values of the criminal justice system itself.61  Insofar as an executive can pardon to 
correct those flaws, his pardon is justified.   As we saw in the last part, this means that there 
seems to be no in principle reason why all of Barbour’s pardons might not have been justified, as 
a means of correcting morally flawed sentences.   To see whether or not this was true, we would 
have to look at each pardon, taken one at a time. 
 In this part, I raise some doubts about the moral sufficiency of this approach.  For there 
may be groups of pardons, all of which could be justified individually, but which might still be 
morally wrong taken together.  I first provide some cases, where intuitively, a group of pardons 
raise some moral questions.  I then, after each case, try to explain why these moral questions 
might render some pardons as a whole unjustified, or at the very least problematic.  I conclude 
this Part by showing that Barbour’s pardons could be morally questionable in precisely these 
ways. 
 
A.  Some Problematic Pardons 
 1.  Racist Pardons 
 
 A Governor in a southern state, decides to commute62 the sentences of four murderers on 
death row to life in prison without the possibility of parole.  He does this, he says, because he 
believes that the death penalty is deeply immoral and inconsistent with the rule of law; and let us 
suppose, just for the sake of argument that he is right about this.63  The death penalty is an 
unjustified and unjustifiable act of punishment, and so anytime the state does it, it is deeply in 
the wrong.  So on Moore’s account, pardons for those on death row would be pardons for good 
and sufficient reasons, for I presume that preventing some from being given a deeply immoral 
punishment is (if anything is) a permissible reason for a pardon. 
                                                          
61 Dan Markel makes a related argument about the values of the criminal justice system and of liberal democracy in 
justifying certain exercises of clemency.  He limits his focus, however, to the death penalty.  See Dan Markel, State, 
Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 
HARV. C.R-C.L. REV. 407 (2005).  I raise some questions about Markel’s argument (and other arguments like his) in 
my paper, The Case Against The Case Against The Death Penalty (unpublished ms, on file with author).    
62 I will sometimes refer to these commutations as “pardons,” just for ease of reference.  But technically, they are 
commutations, not pardons.   
63 The case here bears some resemblance to Governor George Ryan’s commutation of death row in Illinois, which 
has been much discussed in the legal literature.  See Markel, supra note 61, for citations.  I should be clear, however, 
that nothing hangs on the particular example; indeed, I have my doubts that the death penalty is in fact per se 
immoral.   
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 But there is a catch.  There are eight other people on death row in his state who the 
governor has decided not to pardon.   He makes a vague promise that he will pardon the others 
later, when it is politically feasible, but he is at the end of his term, and his announcement of the 
four pardons has engendered considerable controversy.  He will most likely not pardon any of 
the others.      
Moreover (and this is the real problem), it turns out that the four he has decided to 
remove from death row are all of the same color.  They are white, and the remaining non-
pardoned death row inmates are black.  Indeed, this seems to be the only obvious difference 
between those the Governor has pardoned and those he has not; no meaningful distinction can be 
manufactured from the different crimes the convicted murders have committed; all were grisly 
and gruesome, and all were convicted at roughly the same time.   The governor mumbles 
something about having no awareness of the race of those whom he pardoned (“I just saw 
names”64).  But the fact is, the Governor’s pardons were at best been selective and at worst 
implicitly racially motivated.   
 Here we have a case where the four pardons taken individually are done for good and 
sufficient reasons.  Each white person pardoned is pardoned because his sentence of death was 
(we are supposing for the sake of argument) was immoral.  But the problem is that the pardons 
were not comprehensive, or consistent; or rather, if they were consistent, they were consistent on 
the basis of race.  The governor did not pardon all of those who he had a good and sufficient 
reason to pardon. 
 Does this render the pardons he has given illegitimate?  I think there is a strong case that 
it would.  The pardons while justified individually are on the whole distributed in a racially 
unfair way (I bracket for now the question of whether it matters whether this was done 
intentionally or accidentally, a question to which I will return).   So there is a norm that may 
govern the granting of pardons that appears only on the level of pardoning en masse, which we 
can call an anti-discrimination norm.65  Pardons that are distributed in a racially discriminatory 
manner are not permissible, even if the pardons considered individually are justified by good and 
sufficient reasons.  How we understand the force of this norm, I think, is open to debate.66  But I 
think something like that norm exists, and underlies our intuitive reaction to the “all white” 
pardons scenario. 
 
2. Pardoning “Favorites” 
                                                          
64 This was, in fact, a justification offered for the color-blindness of Barbour’s pardons – that race was not listed on 
the application for pardon.  See Patrik Jonsson, Haley Barbour Pardons: Why Were the Forgiven So 
Disproportionately White? C.S. MONITOR (Jan. 21, 2012) available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0121/Haley-Barbour-pardons-Why-were-the-forgiven-so-disproportionately-
white (“A majority of the clemency cases were reviewed by the Parole Board before being sent to Governor 
Barbour,’ Barbour spokesperson Laura Hipp told Reuters, which conducted an analysis of Barbour's pardons. ‘Race 
was not a factor in his decision. In fact, it wasn't even listed on the Parole Board's application.’”) 
65 Although my intuitions change if the governor had announced that the four black members of death row were to 
be pardoned, but not the eight white members.  This shows that the norm operating might be anti-caste, and not 
purely anti-discrimination.   For a discussion of the anti-caste principle, see Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal 
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976). 
66 We might wonder, for example, whether the norm is specifically an anti-racism norm, or one more tied to non-
arbitrariness or respect more generally.   
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Suppose we make this one, small change to the hypothetical: the people the Governor 
pardons are not all of the same race, but they do share something else in common: (a) they are 
friends of friends of the Governor, or (b) they have hired professional lobbyists to make their 
case to the Governor, or (c) they are veterans of the Governor’s “trusty” program,67 or (d) they or 
their relatives are high-profile donors to the Governor’s campaign.68  So, on this hypothetical, 
instead of pardons that are based on race (or that happen to be given to members of the same 
race), we have selective pardons to those with connections of some sort or another to the 
Governor.  Again, let us say that there are four people (out of twelve) who get pardoned, and all 
of them have this relevant feature.  Once more, we are assuming that the death penalty is an 
immoral punishment, so that those four who are pardoned, have a good and sufficient reason to 
be pardoned. 
Are these pardons nonetheless morally problematic?  I would again say yes, of course, 
and for a similar, though not identical, reason to the pardons that we based on race: they pick out 
a non-morally salient characteristic (closeness to governor) as a basis for distinguishing between 
like offenders.  Here the characteristic is possibly not as bad as race (given the fraught history of 
race relations in America, and especially the South), and may be less invidious than choosing on 
the basis of race.  But it still seems wrong to show favoritism to those lucky enough to be friends 
of friends of the Governor, or who have the money to hire a lawyer to lobby the Governor.   So I 
think it is wrong to show favoritism in pardoning, and I think that this wrongness puts into 
question the justifiability of the pardons, even though the pardons taken individually have “good 
and sufficient reasons” to support them.  Call this norm against selective pardoning, the anti-
favoritism norm.     
 
 3.  Random Pardons 
 
   Take many of the same facts from the two previous hypotheticals: a governor decides to 
pardon some, but not all, of those on death row, because it would be too politically unpopular to 
commute all of their sentences.  But this time he does not choose on the basis of race or family 
(or happens to distribute his mercy only to those of a particular race or with family ties), rather, 
he decides to hold a lottery, commuting the sentences of the four who win the lottery.  Again, let 
us suppose that the death penalty is a deeply immoral punishment, and the state is never justified 
in imposing it on anyone.  So a commutation of a person’s death sentence is always justified, for 
preventing someone from suffering an immoral punishment is always a good and sufficient 
                                                          
67 See supra note 5 (explaining the trusty program). 
68 Again, this seems to have been the case with many of Barbour’s pardons.  Campbell Robertson & Stephanie Saul, 
List of Pardons Included Many Tied to Power, NY TIMES A1 (Jan. 28, 2012) (“Yet in a state with the highest 
poverty rate in the nation, where nearly 70 percent of convicts are black, official redemption appears to have been 
attained disproportionately by white people and the well connected.”); id. (“Mississippi’s pardon system, like those 
in other states, rewards applicants who have both the financial means and the connections to seek reprieves 
aggressively.”)    
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reason.  For each person on death row who “wins” the lottery, consequently, there was a good 
and sufficient reason to have his sentence commuted.69   
 Does it make better that the selective outcome of the lottery is random, rather than based 
on the racist or “favoritist” choices of the Governor?  I think it makes them more acceptable, but 
still not acceptable all things considered.  For while the norms against racial discrimination or 
favoritism are not violated, another norm is (of which the norm against racial discrimination and 
favoritism may be instances): the norm against unequal treatment.  The governor is not treating 
like cases alike; instead he is just choosing arbitrarily, based on nothing more than a random 
lottery.  Those who do not win the lottery can complain that they have been unfairly treated, 
because there is nothing that makes their case different than those who have won.   
 Or can they?  I confess to feeling more ambivalent about this case, an ambivalence that 
was absent in the previous, race-based and favorite-based cases.  Those who win the lottery have 
not benefitted from racial discrimination or from family ties.  Instead, those who win the lottery 
get a gift, one that those who lose the lottery do not: and each had an equal shot at getting the 
gift.  Is the implication of the norm against arbitrary treatment that unless all get the pardon, no 
one can?  Do gifts have to be distributed equally, or not at all? 
I think they do, at least in the case of pardoning.  For what the lottery system resembles is 
nothing so much as the old version of the sovereign’s right to pardon: where the sovereign can 
decide how to pardon (for any reason, or for no reason at all) just because he is the sovereign.70  
This seems inconsistent with a system that asks its officials, at all levels, to act according to rule 
of law values like consistency and uniformity.  So although this is a closer case, I conclude that 
pardons that are made on an arbitrary manner are problematic, even if those pardons taken one 
by one, can be justified by good and sufficient reasons.71  They violate the norm against arbitrary 
treatment.72   
At the same time, I need to qualify this (and I will return to this qualification later, in Part 
III of the essay).  For it seems that here, more than in the previous cases, we might want to weigh 
more heavily the wrongness of the underlying punishment: in this case, an immoral and unjust 
                                                          
69 A similar example is introduced in Markel, Against Mercy, supra note 13, at 1464, but for different purposes.  The 
classic thought-experiment of chance and the criminal law is David Lewis, The Punishment That Leaves Something 
to Chance, 18  PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 53 (1989).  
70 See supra note 30 (pardon power as exercise of the sovereign’s power). 
71 Avraham and Statman argue that the race case differs from the random case, because in the race case one has been 
disrespected, but not when one has been randomly favored or disfavored  But my intuitions differ here: why isn’t a 
matter of disrespect to decide desert questions on the basis of a lottery?  Why wouldn’t this, as well, show a 
disrespectful attitude towards the offender’s fate?   Wouldn’t it also suggest a possible trifling attitude towards 
questions of desert and justice?   Avraham & Statman, supra note 28, at 8. 
72 It is important to note that not all selective pardons are arbitrary.  A favoritist method of selection and a random 
method of selection may be objectionable, but not a method that, say, selects whom to pardon based on the fact that 
some of those on death row committed less gruesome crimes than others, or that some convicts were more reformed.  
See, on this point, Stephen Nathanson, Does It Matter If the Death Penalty Is Arbitrarily Administered?, 14 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFFAIRS, 153 (1985) (“For example, though we may acknowledge the impossibility of ticketing all speeding 
drivers and still favor ticketing some, we will not find every way of determining which speeders are ticketed equally 
just. Consider the policy of ticketing only those who travel at extremely high speeds, as opposed to that of ticketing 
every tenth car. Compare these with the policy of giving tickets only to speeders with beards and long hair or to 
speeders whose cars bear bumper stickers expressing unpopular political views. While I shall not pursue this point in 
detail, I take it to be obvious that these different selection policies are not all equally just or acceptable.”).  Selective 
pardons made for efficiency reasons, too, could be justified – indeed, even if a lottery was used to make the choices.   
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execution.  It may be that that wrongness would be sufficient to outweigh the wrong done by a 
random pardon (however we might specify that wrong).  This may suggest that we are always 
doing an implicit balancing between the harm of the wrong (unjust, harsh) punishment and the 
harm done by the pardon being racist, biased, or random.  It was only that in the cases of racism 
and favoritism, it seemed clearer that those wrongs were more possibly worse than the wrong of 
the unfair punishments (or at least the unfair punishments of those who were lucky enough to be 
pardoned).  Our calculation could be more complicated still if it was a question of pardoning 
some who had been wrongly convicted by a lottery, and not pardoning any.          
 
 4.   Pardons for the Wrong Reasons 
 
 Now consider a final twist on the above example.  Let us suppose that the governor now 
commutes the sentences of all twelve members of death row.  So there is no question of unfair or 
arbitrary treatment of any of them; they all get their sentences commuted, no one is excluded for 
any reason.  But there is again a catch.  The reason, this time, that the governor pardons all of 
them, is that they are (similar to the case of favoritist pardons) friends of friends.  He cannot get 
them out of prison altogether (that would be politically infeasible), but he can prevent them from 
being executed. 
 The death penalty is still, as we have been suggesting for the sake of argument, a deeply 
immoral penalty, so that it is never justified that someone be put to death for a crime they have 
committed.  So the pardons in fact consistent with good and sufficient reasons for mercy, 
because it is a good and sufficient reason to prevent someone from receiving an immoral 
punishment.   
But this, of course, is not the reason the Governor gives in commuting the sentences.  He 
says he is commuting their sentences because it is traditional to pardon members of the “trusty” 
program.73  Or it could even be that the Governor says he’s pardoning good and sufficient 
reasons (the immorality of the death penalty), but his real reason is because of the personal 
connections he has with the inmates.  Moreover, unlike the previous three cases, the Governor 
has given all twelve of the death row inmates pardons, so that his treatment of them is not in any 
way “selective.”  To use Kant’s helpful terminology, the Governor in this case is pardoning 
according to duty, but he is not pardoning from the motive of duty.74  His pardons just happen to 
be coextensive with the pardons he ought to be giving.   
 Is there anything wrong with the pardons in this case?  I think there is, because the 
professed reasons the Governor gave don’t match up with the proper reasons, and the professed 
reasons are not, in fact, good and sufficient reasons for pardoning.  To put it another way, there is 
a disconnect between what would justify the commutations, and what in fact did justify them for 
the Governor.   What justified the pardons for the Governor was that the people who had their 
sentences commuted had a personal connection to him.  But (we are supposing) it turns out that 
                                                          
73 Barbour, supra note 11 (“This was not a new thing. For decades, Mississippi governors have granted clemency to 
the inmates who work at the mansion. I followed that tradition four years ago and did so again at the end of my 
second term. No one should have been surprised.”); Barbour’s past pardons of trusties were no less controversial.  
See Bob Herbert, The Mississippi Pardons, NY TIMES (Oct 15, 2010). 
74 See, e.g., the exposition of Kant in Barbara Herman, On the Value of Acting from a Motive of Duty, 90 PHIL. 
REVIEW 359 (1981). 
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those who had a personal connection with him also were justified in having their sentences 
commuted. 
 Still, it was in some sense a matter of sheer chance that those who are no longer on death 
row in fact should not have been on death row in the first place.  They got off ultimately because 
of their connection to the governor (and the Governor’s subsequent favoritism), not for the “good 
and sufficient” reasons that were available to justify their commutations.75  It just happens that 
all twelve had this characteristic this time, rather than just four of them.   
So in short, we’ve eliminated the selectivity of the pardons, but reintroduced another 
problem, related to, but not quite the same as the problem of favoritism.  The problem is that the 
reason why the Governor gave the pardons isn’t the reasons he should have given.  I am not sure 
exactly what to call this disconnect, but for the sake of convenience, let us say that there is a 
sincerity constraint on pardoning: the actual reasons for pardons have to be the good and 
sufficient reasons for the pardons, no other reasons will do.76  It seems to me the weakest form of 
wrongdoing that can be committed in a mass pardons case; it also seems to me that this type of 
wrong will usually not be unaccompanied by some actual favoritism that leaves some without 
pardons who deserve to be pardoned.77  
 
B.  Barbour’s Pardons Revisited 
 
 At the time of Barbour’s pardons, there was widespread outrage.78  Part of this, indeed 
probably most of it, was because of individual pardons: the murderers or the drunk drivers who 
were pardoned when the wounds from their crimes were not yet healed.79  But I also think there 
was a larger disillusionment with Barbour’s pardons, which came not from analyzing each case 
one at a time and deciding that the pardon in that case was not warranted.  After all, it seems very 
likely that some of the pardons were justified by good and sufficient reasons: the ones who 
needed medical release, for example, or those who were convicted long ago for minor drug 
possession, and who wanted to be able to vote, or have an easier time getting a job. 
 Yet many condemned the pardons as a whole and I think the above section explains why 
this might have happened.  Consider the anti-discrimination norm.  Two thirds of those Barbour 
pardoned were white, while two thirds of the Mississippi prison population is black.80  
                                                          
75 For a similar sentiment see Nathanson, supra note 72, at 157. 
76  For a good explanation of the value of sincerity, and the related concept of publicity, see Micah Schwartzman, 
The Principle of Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1005-1008 (2008).    
77 That is to say, it will not usually be the case that the class of those who deserve to be pardoned will always be 
coextensive with the class of those who are friends of the governor).              
78 Judy Keen, Barbour’s Pardons Stir Outrage in Mississippi, USA TODAY (Jan. 13, 2012), available at 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-01-12/mississippi-barbour-pardons/52511486/1; Mark 
Memmott, Hundreds of Pardons, Some for Killers, Spark Outrage in Mississippi, NPR, ( Jan. 11, 2012), available at  
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/01/11/145039829/hundreds-of-pardons-some-for-killers-spark-outrage-
in-mississippi; P.S. Ruckman Jr., Barbour’s Last Minute Rush to Pardon, CNN, (Jan. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/12/opinion/ruckman-haley-barbour-pardons/?hpt=us_c2   
79 See Memmott, supra note 78; Julia Dahl, 8 of the Murderers Barbour Pardoned Killed Their Wives, Girlfriends, 
CRIMESIDER (Jan. 13, 2012) available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57358839-504083/8-of-the-
murderers-haley-barbour-pardoned-killed-their-wives-girlfriends/. 
80 See Jonsson, supra note 8. 
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Overwhelmingly, then, you had a better chance at a pardon if you were white than if you were 
black.  This at least gives the appearance that the anti-discrimination norm was being violated, if 
not intentionally, at least as a matter of discriminatory effects.  Indeed, the pardons might have 
been part of a deeper, structural racism in the entire process of pardoning, from the 
recommendation by the parole board for pardons to the granting of the pardons themselves.  So 
even if Barbour did not knowingly pardon more whites than blacks (he was not aware of the race 
of those he pardoned), the pardons may still have been the product of racism, and so problematic 
for that reason.81 
 There might have also been the perception that the pardons were arbitrary, that they were 
simply indiscriminately given.  The person that Barbour happened to get to know as a trusty was 
pardoned, but one who did similar service, and committed a similar crime, was not.  Or a 
convicted criminal who was able to get the Governor’s ear because he had a relative working for 
Barbour might have gotten a pardon, but one who had no connections to Barbour did not.  Or 
still further, someone who could afford to hire an attorney to lobby Barbour got a pardon, but 
someone without money and an attorney does not. 
 Pardons that are given on such an indiscriminate or random basis might be thought to be 
unfair, because they treated those who are similarly situated differently based on morally 
arbitrary factors.82   It turns it into a matter of mostly chance whether you would be pardoned or 
not: whether you, or someone close to you, knew someone who could get the Governor’s ear.  
But chance shouldn’t be the deciding factor.  The only deciding factor should be whether there 
were good or sufficient reasons for your pardon.  In other words, the reason for the pardon 
should be the good and sufficient reason for the pardon, and not any other reason.     
So people may have been reacting to the apparently arbitrary nature of many of Barbour’s 
pardons.  They seemed not to have been made in any sort of orderly or reasoned manner.83  Even 
if many of those pardoned were pardoned for good and sufficient reasons, there may have been 
others who were not, but who should have been, because there were also good and sufficient 
reasons for pardoning them.84   It at least looked as if Barbour might not have been being entirely 
consistent in choosing whom to pardon.     
                                                          
81 Id. (“Perhaps more than incarceration rate disparities, however, pardon rate inconsistencies suggest that biases 
may be less individual and more systemic. In Mississippi, for example, black prisoners, on the whole, have fewer 
resources than white prisoners, including access to personal lawyers, which may have led to fewer black prisoners 
requesting a pardon in the first place. “); see also Nathanson, supra note 72, at 160 (“What I want to stress here is 
that the arbitrariness and discrimination need not be purposeful or deliberate. We might discover, as critics allege, 
that racial prejudice is so deeply rooted in our society that prosecutors, juries, and judges cannot free themselves 
from prejudice when deter-mining how severe a punishment for a crime should be. Furthermore, we might conclude 
that these tendencies cannot be eradicated, especially when juries are called upon to make subtle and complex 
assessments of cases in the light of confusing, semi-technical criteria. Hence, although no one decides that race will 
be a factor, we may predict that it will be a factor, and this knowledge must be considered in evaluating policies and 
institutions.”). 
82 See Robertson & Saul, supra note6 (“Many of the applications contain the type of recommendations that a poor 
person could be hard-pressed to collect: character references from state legislators or local elected officials. … In 
other cases, applicants relied on someone who had the connections they lacked.”). 
83 See Ruckman, supra note 78 (“The signs of a last-minute rush abound. Well over half of the warrants do not even 
provide the specific sentences that were handed down by the courts. Other critical dates are missing right and left.”).   
84 See Robertson & Saul, supra note6 (giving examples of similarly situated convicts who were not pardoned).   
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 But with Barbour, it was worse than simply appearing inconsistent.  For the pardons 
Barbour made didn’t seem to be made merely on the basis of chance but were instead made for 
reasons of the wrong sort.  They were made because of connections to the Governor, whether 
these were personal, familial, or the result of lobbying.   It wasn’t as if Barbour held a lottery to 
see who would get pardoned; this would still be unfair, but the unfairness might be of a lesser 
kind.  Rather, the people who got pardoned (it seemed) had a connection to the Governor.   In 
fact, it was as if the main factor in many cases was the existence of this connection.85  It would 
have been better if the pardons had been entirely random; still morally problematic, but better.   
 If this was true in many cases, and not just one or two, then this provides another reason 
for criticizing the pardons as a whole, even if they can be justified case-by-case.   For if the mode 
of distributing the pardons is not just arbitrary, but based on favoritism, then the pardons as a 
whole may be problematic, not because there are not good and sufficient reasons for them (we 
are assuming there might be) but because of the way they are given out.  A bad mode of 
distribution (connections to the governor) might put into question all of the pardons, even 
pardons that could have been justified for good and sufficient reasons.86   
 
 C.  Some Recent Presidential Pardons  
 A recent, searching report by the public interest group ProPublica has raised questions 
about presidential pardons, which reflect, on a smaller scale, the problems that were noted in 
relation to Barbour’s pardons.87  The two conclusions of the study, which were reported in the 
Washington Post, was that the pardons granted by George W. Bush heavily favored whites, and 
that “political influence … continued to boost pardon applicants.”88  The study conducted by the 
authors was based on a random sample of five hundred people out of the nearly two thousand 
people who had requested pardons during the second Bush’s presidency.89 
 The number pardoned by Bush during his entire presidency was 189, a little less than the 
total number that Barbour pardoned in the final days of his governorship.90  Yet they seem to 
reflect writ small what Barbour’s pardons display writ large, viz., that when taken as a whole, 
pardons can be problematic in a way they are not when they are taken individually.  The authors 
at ProPublica shows this point by a series of careful comparisons, between, say, a white woman 
who attempted to defraud the IRS of more than $25,000 who got a pardon, and an African-
American beauty shop owner who was convicted of underreporting her income, who was not.91  
They also investigate, in detail, a case where a donation to a Congressman helped secure a last-
minute pardon.92  
                                                          
85 Id. 
86 To be sure a bad mode of distribution can be present even in one pardon; but when it is done with many pardons, 
the badness of it becomes more evident (as was the case with Barbour).   
87 See DAFNA LINZER & JENNIFER LAFLEUR, PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS: SHADES OF MERCY (2012). 
88 Id. at Loc. 37.   
89 Id. at Loc. 12.   
90 Id. at Loc. 8. 
91 Id. at Loc. 50.   
92 Id. at Loc. 280ff. (pardon efforts of luxury car dealer Dale Critz Jr. helped by donations to Republican 
Representative Jack Kingston).   
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 Those in the Bush administration expressed surprise at the result, and insisted that the 
process was “color-blind.”93  And we may think that the real problem here is the paucity of 
pardons (something that has continued with a vengeance into the Obama administration94), and 
not necessarily their basis, a point which I return to in Part III.   There may also be problems of 
what are legitimate criteria for selecting people for pardons, a point of possible disagreement.  
The Bush administration’s officials apparently took marriage as a key factor in signaling whether 
someone had been rehabilitated or not, as showing greater “stability.”95  But they also looked to 
more amorphous factors such as “attitude,” something which might open the door to all sorts of 
bias, or might which give wiggle room to favor some over the others based on political 
pressure.96  There was, in fact, one instance of obvious racial bias in the Bush’s consideration of 
a pardon from a Nigerian minister.97 
 A final, notorious example might also be worth mentioning.  In 2007, George W. Bush 
commuted the sentence of I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, saving Libby from having to serve two and 
one half years for his role in leaking the identity of Central Intelligence Agent Valerie Plame.98  
In his remarks defending the pardon, Bush said that a thirty-month prison sentence for Libby was 
“excessive.”99  Reportedly, Vice President Dick Chaney was furious that Bush did not give 
Libby a complete pardon (Libby was still on the hook for a $250,000 fine and remained a 
convicted felon).100  Although many conservatives felt that Libby’s fine was a miscarriage of 
justice (liberals disagreed), it seems clear that without Libby’s close connection to the President 
and the Vice-President he would probably not have been even a candidate for a pardon.  In short, 
whatever the individual merits of the Libby case, it certainly was a pardon based on favoritism.   
 And it seems fair to say that in many other cases, and not just in the Libby case, Bush’s 
pardons were as problematic as Barbour’s were.  Even though they may have been granted, in 
most cases, for good and sufficient reasons, the way they were pardoned showed problems: 
problems of bias, or of favorable treatment, or of sheer arbitrariness.  They show why a theory of 
pardons needs to regulate more than just individual pardoning, but the pardoning process as a 
whole, because sometimes why a pardon is wrong cannot be discovered in isolation, but only 
when compared to other instances of pardons granted or not granted.       
  
                                                          
93 Id. at Loc. 92, 495.   
94 David Jackson, Obama Not a “Pardoning” Kind of President, USA TODAY (Nov. 2, 2012) available at  
http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2012/11/02/obama-mitt-romney-pardons/1676909/ (“Obama has pardoned 
only 22 individuals during his time in office, while denying 1,019 other clemency requests[.]”).    Obama’s pardon 
rate is the lowest among any modern president.  Id.   
95  LINZER & LAFLEUR, PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS: SHADES OF MERCY, at Loc. 105. 
96 Id. at Loc. 71.   
97 Id. at Loc. 215. See Allison Gender, Furor over Bush Lawyer’s Racism in Deportation Cases of Nigerian Minister, 
NY DAILY NEWS (July 14. 2008) available at  http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/furor-bush-lawyer-racism-
deportation-case-nigerian-minister-article-1.349796. 
98 See Bush Commutes “Scooter” Libby’s Prison Sentence, FOXNEWS.COM (July 7, 2007) available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,287780,00.html.   
99 Scott Shane and Neil A. Lewis, Bush Commutes Libby’s Sentence, Saying 30 Months “Is Excessive, NY TIMES 
(July 3, 2007) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/03/washington/03libby.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
100 Thomas M. DeFrank, Ex-VP Dick Cheney Outraged President Bush Didn’t Grant “Scooter” Libby Full Pardon, 
DAILY NEWS  (Feb. 17, 2009) available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ex-vp-dick-cheney-outraged-
president-bush-didn-grant-scooter-libby-full-pardon-article-1.370889.   
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IV. Toward a Second Best Theory of Pardons 
 
 The second and third Parts of this paper, taken together, frame a dilemma that arises in 
many real-world cases of pardoning.  On the one hand, some pardons will be clearly justified by 
good and sufficient reasons.  So, for example, an executive will be justified in pardoning when 
an innocent person has been convicted and sentenced, or when the sentence is too harsh.  But on 
the other hand, if an executive pardons only some of those he has good and sufficient reasons to 
pardon, and the basis on which he does so is selective along some forbidden ground (race or 
favoritism) or is done randomly, even individually justified pardons can become morally 
problematic.  The result is cases such as the ones we examined in the last Part: where even 
facially “good” pardons, when distributed on a “bad” basis, become suspect.  In an ideal world, 
an executive would pardon all those who should be pardoned, and not make choices on whom to 
pardon for invidious or arbitrary reasons. 
But this is not always what happens, and so we need a way to assess when pardons are 
both good and bad: good because they sometimes serve individual justice, bad because they also 
involve some other unfairness.  To do this, I employ in this Part John Rawls’s language of 
“ideal” and “non-ideal” theory a distinction closely related to the idea of “second-best” theory.  
Pardons are non-ideal or second best in two ways.  First, they are second best, because in an 
ideal world, we would never need to pardon: the laws would be fair, and the sentences given 
would be justice.   
But pardons can be second best in another way, too.  They can be given out in ways that 
don’t accord with our considered notions of fairness, or non-discrimination, or non-favoritism.  
The prevailing justifications of the pardoning power have focused too much on the way pardons 
can correct individual mistakes in the criminal justice system; but they have taken too little 
notice of the way in which pardons can introduce new kinds of injustices.  So we have to be able 
to judge pardons along both individual and collective lines, and to explain how sometimes 
individual pardons can be unjustified for reasons that are unrelated to the justice of the particular 
case.  This is what I hope, in introducing the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory, to 
give us the tools to do.   
 
A.  Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory   
 The idea of “ideal theory” was developed by John Rawls, in his now-classic Theory of 
Justice.101  Rawls used the term to structure his political philosophy as a whole.  What he was 
going to do, he said, was to sketch out his picture of an ideal society, a “realistic utopia,” 102 as 
he would call it: a society which was, as much as it was possible for humans as they were, 
perfectly just.  In doing so, he would make certain assumptions, one of which (the key one, 
actually) was that everyone would comply with the law.103   
                                                          
101 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, at 245-248 (discussion of ideal and non-ideal theory). 
102 See RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 128 (1999) (“By showing how the social world may realize the features of a 
realistic utopia, political philosophy provides a long-term goal of political endeavor, and in working toward it gives 
meaning to what we can do today.”). 
103 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, at 25 (“[F]or the most part I examine the principles of justice that would regulate 
a well-ordered society.  Everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part in upholding just institutions.”).   
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 If this is criterion (i.e., total compliance) is taken as the sine qua non of ideal theory, then 
there cannot be a full ideal theory of criminal justice.104  If people obey the law, they will never 
be tried or punished, and so we will not need a complete understanding or description of the 
institutions of criminal justice.  This explains, in part, Rawls’s focus in his book on problems of 
distributive (and later, social) justice and his almost complete disregard of questions of crime and 
punishment.105  Fortunately, however, we can find a use in Rawls’s distinction between ideal and 
non-ideal theory. 
 We can still speak, almost in ordinary language terms, of ideal theory as that which 
comes close to embodying, or embodies, our idea of a perfectly just society.  We can then speak 
of our society, in contrast, as a non-ideal one.  The main point I want to borrow from Rawls is 
this: the rules that govern a non-ideal society will be different than those that govern the ideal 
society, because there may be some things we need to do to get to the ideal that may no longer be 
permissible once we live in the ideal society.106  Rawls’s book itself is short on examples, and 
here is no exception, but he gives some in this context.  He considers the possibility that slavery 
or serfdom, given some economically distressed regimes, could be permissible for a time, until 
securing the basic liberties was economically feasible.  He also proposes that certain restrictions 
on democracy could be justified as a matter of non-ideal theory.107  
 Rawls’s first point in these examples is that in certain circumstances, ideal theory can’t 
govern a society directly, because if it did, that society would never get to the ideal.  We would 
starve before we got to the point of having a functioning constitutional democracy.  In a way, 
non-ideal theory says that you can break the ideal rules.  But Rawls also has a second point, 
which is this: even when it departs from the ideal, non-ideal theory must aim at the ideal.  Non-
ideal has to take ideal theory as its guide, because, after all, the point of breaking the rules is to 
get us closer to the ideal of the ideally just society.  Ideal theory constrains non-ideal theory not 
absolutely, like strict rule, but more like a standard that the non-ideal society tries to 
approximate.108 
 But then the puzzle becomes: how do we determine when departures from the ideal rules 
are permissible and when they are not?  We could imagine one extreme, saying that they were 
never permissible, but this would just be to reject the possibility of non-ideal theory.   At the 
other extreme would be to simply give up on the idea of ideal theory and just simply balance on 
each occasion.  But it seems that we need a conception of what we aiming for in order to give 
content to our balancing, so this extreme seems unpalatable as well. 
 There can be no general answer to this puzzle.  The notion of “ideal theory” is at the end 
of the day a useful metaphor, to think about how to reform society for the better.  Should we 
think mostly in terms of aiming towards an ideal society?  Or should we think instead in terms of 
eliminating obvious injustices?109  In the case of pardons, I think it is best to think in terms of an 
ideal we are aiming for: the ideal that we have a criminal justice system that both operates fairly 
                                                          
104 Id. (putting “such topics as the theory of punishment” in non-ideal, or “partial compliance,” theory).    
105 I examine this point further in Punishment and Political Philosophy: The Case of John Rawls (ms on file with 
author).   
106 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, at 279.   
107 Id. Rawls means to apply these examples to cases of economically developing societies.    
108 Here the massive literature on rules and standards is relevant.  See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).    
109 Amartya Sen is the most notable exponent of this position.  See SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (2009).   
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for all and does not unjustly punish anyone.  So we have to ask, what measures can we use to 
arrive at this ideal, without sacrificing the ideal in the process?  Ideal theory helps us show what 
is at stake when there are pardons that are done for morally arbitrary reasons, like race or 
favoritism: they show that there may be something wrong with a pardon, even if that pardon in 
the individual case is done for good and sufficient reasons.   
 
B.  Applying Non-Ideal Theory to Pardons 
 
 Barbour’s pardons were not universally condemned.  Some praised Barbour’s conversion 
from a strict law-and-order man, to one who was capable of forgiveness, showing his Christian 
side.110  Others, including the prominent civil rights lawyer John Payton, hailed Barbour’s large 
number of pardons as (merely) putting a dent in mass incarceration.  The main problem was that 
Barbour had not gone far enough.   His pardons were only a drop in the bucket, Payton said.111 
 Payton’s perspective is important, because it puts Barbour’s pardons in the larger context 
of the injustice of America’s criminal justice system as a whole.   It is almost universally agreed 
that too many people are in prison, for too long, and for relatively minor offenses.  Recent 
declines in the prison population only serve to highlight how far we have to go.   Moreover, the 
stigma and the harms of those offenses last well beyond their release from prison: they suffer 
hardships in receiving aid, getting jobs, and being able to vote.112  Again, it is very probable that 
some if not all of Barbour’s pardons were done for good and sufficient reasons.  And again, most 
of the offenders were not ones that were just released from prison; rather they had been released 
for years, had reformed themselves, and were trying to get under the burden of a past conviction.   
 This is in a way to repeat what I suggested in Part II of the paper: that there were 
probably many of Barbour’s pardons that could have been justified by good and sufficient 
reasons, if he wanted to.   But we should emphasize that if these pardons were so justified, they 
were, according to Moore, matters of justice.  It was unjust that these people should have 
suffered from their sentences, and it was a matter of justice that Barbour should pardon them.  
The Barbour pardons were at least in some cases done in the interests of making sentences just. 
 Then how could they be at the same time wrong?  Here I need to step back and make a 
larger point about progress towards an just society which is not limited to Barbour’s pardons.  
Suppose that we lived in an ideally just society, where the criminal law was just and fairly 
administered.  In this society, all or nearly all trials would result in the conviction of the guilty, 
and the guilty would be punished according to their desert.113  Still, we can imagine that there 
would be some mistakes in the administration of justice, where people slipped up, not necessarily 
intentionally, but as a matter of simple human error.    
                                                          
110  Molly M. Gill, Why Did Governor Haley Barbour’s Pardons Cause Such a Backlash? HUFF. POST (Jan. 19, 
2012) available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/molly-m-gill/haley-barbour-pardons_b_1217237.html (defending 
Barbour in part on religious grounds).   
111 E.R. Shipp, What’s All The Fuss About In Missouri? THE ROOT (Jan. 31, 2012) available at 
http://www.theroot.com/views/whats-all-fuss-about-mississippi?page=0,1 
112 See Zach Hoskins,  “Hard times after hard time: Are ex-offender restrictions justified?” (ms on file with author).     
113 On this, see CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, chapter 37 (“Clemency, which has often been 
deemed a sufficient substitute for every other virtue in sovereigns, should be excluded in a perfect legislation, where 
punishments are mild, and the proceedings in criminal cases regular and expeditious.”). 
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 In this case, where we errors are relatively infrequent, we might see the importance of the 
pardon power as patching up some of the flaws in the system, in order to take a mostly or nearly 
just society closer to being a perfectly just society.  Pardons are one way of doing this.  Other 
places of discretion, in the hands of the police, the prosecutor, or the jury, could also work to 
“patch up” flaws.114  Pardons and these other measures would be, as many have stated, necessary 
“safety valves” to the workings of the criminal justice system, to account for human fallibility.  
Note, however, that these would be entirely legalistic pardons, in Moore’s use of the term.  They 
would be pardons when human actors failed to follow (to the letter) the hypothetically just laws 
and punishments. 
 Now suppose we live in a far from ideal society, where the many criminal laws 
themselves are irrational or unjust, where sentencing is on the whole too harsh, where mandatory 
minimums are the norm, and where the consequences of being imprisonment carry harms far 
past the date of release.  In such a world, which I take it is very near (or identical) to our world, 
the use of “safety valves” would be especially important, 115 and we might actively call for 
greater use of them, such as Paul Butler’s case for greater jury nullification,116 or pleas for 
governors to pardon everybody on death row.117  What’s more, the use of these would be in 
many cases amply justified as a way to mitigate, if not eliminate, much of the legal harshness of 
the criminal justice status quo.   Barbour’s pardons can certainly be seen as doing this, at least 
partly, even if it is only a drop in the bucket.  It is probably true that in our society, as many have 
argued, the pardon power should be used more often and more aggressively than it is currently 
being used.118     
The problem is that although pardons (and the like) can be used as means to achieving the 
substantively just society, there comes a point when the use of that means conflicts with the ideal 
of the just society.  This is what, arguably, happened in the case of Barbour.  It does not do any 
honor to the idea of a racially fair justice system to reinforce that bias by pardoning, 
disproportionately, members of the white race.  And it does not support the idea that justice is 
non-arbitrary to assign pardons in a seemingly random and scatter-shot manner.  Further, a just 
criminal law is not promoted when the law is found to bend in favor of family, or in favor of 
those with money.   
The larger point is that the way the criminal justice system is patched up, or reformed, 
must be on the whole consistent with the values of an ideal criminal justice system.   This seems 
especially important when those reforms are made in a large-scale manner, as was the case with 
Barbour’s pardons.  In short, there are constraints on acting justly in pursuit of a more perfectly 
justice society.  These are the constraints that, to use John Rawls’s terminology, ideal theory 
places on actors in the real world.   
                                                          
114 Barkow groups these points of discretion in her essay on administrative law and the demise of mercy; Barkow, 
supra note 14. 
115 Molly M. Gill, Why Did Governor Haley Barbour’s Pardons Cause Such a Backlash? HUFF. POST (Jan. 19, 
2012) available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/molly-m-gill/haley-barbour-pardons_b_1217237.html (“The 
pardon power is often the only remedy for those who have been unfairly or excessively punished in the harsh and 
inflexible sentencing system we have spent 30 years building. Pardons and commutations can correct some of these 
injustices.”) 
116 Paul Butler, In Defense of Jury Nullification, 31 LITIGATION 46 (2004).  
117 See Markel, supra note 63. 
118 See references supra note 17. 
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 This means that if pardons are to be given, they should ideally be given for good and 
sufficient reasons, and should only be distributed because of those reasons.  That means that they 
cannot be distributed in other ways, ways that might be racially biased, or arbitrary, or based in 
favoritism.  If they are distributed in these ways, they go against the larger ideals of criminal 
justice, and for that reason, are morally suspect, if not morally impermissible.     
 Of course, in the real world, pardons will never be perfectly fair.  Like cases will not 
always be treated in a like matter.  Some arbitrariness seems inevitable in a system administered 
by human beings and not by machines (it will also be very difficult, if not impossible, to 
compare cases along a common metric).  This should not be a barrier to allowing any pardons, as 
I explain in greater detail in the next section.  It is only when the moral arbitrariness is so large as 
to be obvious that it becomes a problem, when there does not seem to be any semblance of 
following a uniform procedure, or uniform standards for offering pardons.  This means that even 
if in one sense pardons are permissible violations of rule of law values (such as consistency and 
finality), then must still be held to ideals of the rule of law, ideals of anti-discrimination, non-
arbitrariness, and sincerity.  When pardoning decisions fail to adhere to these ideals, they are 
morally problematic, even when taken one by one they have good and sufficient reasons behind 
them.      
 
C.  Two Important Qualifications 
 
 I should be clear what the implications of the above are by making two qualifications.  
The first qualification is that the constraints placed by non-ideal theory still leave considerable 
room for pardoning.  We can pardon all those we have good and sufficient reasons for pardoning, 
provided that we do so with minimal bias (no overt racism or favoritism or randomness).   Of 
course there is not total room; at some place the constraints of ideal theory have to kick in.  This 
leads to my second qualification: even when the constraints do kick in, there may be some cases 
where we decide that those constraints, too, must be abandoned.  We might decide, that is, that 
the present injustice is so great that even ideal theory has to give way, and that the force of the 
reasons underlying the individual pardons outweigh the fact that the pardon is arbitrary, or racist, 
or insincere. 
 There has been a growing chorus over the past two decades that the pardon power has 
been used too sparingly by executives, especially the President.  This chorus has practically 
grown to a roar over the number of pardons granted by Obama, one of the lowest of any 
President’s term.119  George W. Bush has also been criticized on this score.  I join my voice to 
this chorus: given the present injustice of the status quo there are many, many pardons that not 
only can be made for good and sufficient reasons, but ought to be made.     
So my conclusions in the previous sections of this paper should not be taken as a 
condemnation of the pardon power; far from it.  As I elaborated in Part I, I believe that there is a 
powerful moral case for the pardon power.  What I showed in Part II is only that there are limits 
to the pardon power not only in the individual case, but when we consider (individually justified) 
pardons as a whole.  This raised the possibility that an executive’s pardons on-the-whole might 
be morally unjustified.   
                                                          
119 David Jackson, Obama Not a “Pardoning” Kind of President, supra note 94. 
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 But this is not the last word.  For the answer to objections about problematic on-the-
whole pardons is an obvious one: it is not to not pardon at all but to level up.120  That is, instead 
of refusing to pardon because of fear of arbitrarily pardoning, one should, if anything, be more 
generous in granting pardons especially given the pervasive injustice in America’s criminal 
justice system.121  In the case referenced above, about the two roughly situated individuals, one 
who evaded taxes, and the other who committed tax fraud, the answer to the question of which 
should be pardoned is relatively easy: pardon both of them.  Generally, it does not seem the case 
that one arbitrary pardon renders many legitimate pardons illegitimate.  It is only when, in cases 
such as Barbour’s one gets the sense that nearly all of the pardons were granted on arbitrary 
basis, that the problem of arbitrary pardons arises.  Moreover, there are types of seeming 
randomness, that can reflect acceptable (or at least morally neutral) types of selectivity, such as 
budget pressures.122 
 But then, of course, there are cases like Barbour’s, where there is a question of whether 
the pardons can be justified en masse.  We might even say that, if Barbour leveled up this time 
around – pardoning not just trusties, but others on the pardon board’s list – he had not leveled up 
enough.  There were still more, similarly situated convicts who merited consideration for a 
pardon.   So in his case, I have suggested, the arbitrariness, and possibly discriminatory nature of 
his pardons was enough to make all of this pardons problematic.  He might have done many 
individual good acts, but there was something about the acts, taken together, that was morally 
questionable. 
  So this leads us to the question: Is there reason to think that with Barbour’s pardons, the 
values of non-arbitrariness, non-discrimination, etc., should have outweighed the “good and 
sufficient reasons” Barbour had for pardoning?  There is a strong case to be made that, yes, they 
should have.  Sometimes the values of ideal theory should outweigh justice in individual cases, 
especially when the value of that justice is relatively minor.   
For consider: most of the sentences Barbour commuted were already served out; most of 
those who were suffering from their crimes were no longer suffering from the sentences per se, 
but from the stigma of their crimes.  As Barbour hastened to point out, he freed very few people 
from prison.123  The value that would actually come from the pardon would be mostly be in 
terms of avoiding the stigma (and associated harms) of conviction, and not avoiding the harm of 
unjust imprisonment; the person who had finished his term of years would now no longer be 
considered a “felon” in the eyes of the law thanks to Barbour’s pardons.  In these cases, we 
should say: the ideals of ideal theory should win out, because the injustices, the individual 
injustices, that would be cured are relatively minor, and the violation of the values of consistency 
and fairness seemed patent.  (Of course, that does not make them any less injustices, nor does it 
mean that the best thing for Barbour to have done would have been to pardon more people.) 
 Then we get to the cases that made up most of my examples, where the death sentences 
of some were reduced to life in prison, but not all of those who were similarly situated.  Is the 
                                                          
120 I am grateful to Ronen Avraham for emphasizing this point to me in correspondence.   Ronen Avraham, E-mail 
to Author (Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with author).   
121 See the sources cited supra note 23. 
122 Supra note 72. 
123 As the title of his Washington Post op-ed advertises.   See Haley Barbour, Why I Released 26 Prisoners, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 18, 2012). 
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answer to this to not pardon any of them, and let them all be put to death?  Should the value of 
consistency win out even here?124  Certainly, this would not be the favored outcome: the favored 
outcome would be that none of them should be put to death.  But then we have to ask, what if 
this outcome (for whatever reason) is unavailable?  Does that mean that the second best option 
(to pardoning some) is that all should not be pardoned?  This sounds like a harsh, even 
unacceptably harsh, result.  Arbitrary pardons in this case might be the true “second best.”   
Better that some avoid death than all face the death penalty.   
 In the death penalty debate in the 1970s, the arbitrariness (and racial selectiveness of the 
death penalty) was hotly debated: those who were against the death penalty vigorously argued 
that the randomness of the death penalty was a strong reason against it.125  But they faced the 
reply that if this was so, then the remedy was equally to give more people the death penalty 
rather than to abolish the penalty altogether.126  I do not want to get into the particulars of this 
debate, but to note the similarity to the question above: one on side were those favoring the rule 
of law values of consistency and fairness, up against those who favored the substantive justice of 
the death penalty in individual cases.  Of course, in this case, the rule of law values were 
supported by the death penalty opponents, and the substantive justice values by the proponents.  
But the structure of the debate seems similar to the question we are facing: in the case of the 
conflict, what should win, the substantive justice or the procedural values? 
 There may be no general answer to this question in some extreme cases, of which the 
death penalty cases must surely be.  My point in the use of the examples in the second Part was 
to point where the use of pardons could be morally problematic, and not morally prohibited.  
Racism, favoritism, and arbitrariness seem to me to be strong reasons to question the justice of a 
punishment, whether this is a case of a punishment being imposed or a punishment being 
removed.  This is why it still seems to me that in the race case, the awfulness of the 
discriminatory message sent by pardoning only whites might be sufficient to trump the 
substantive injustice (if it is one) of execution.127  Might.    
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 Over the years there have been many proposals from both practitioners and academics to 
remove the pardon power from the executive, or at least reduce it, and give the power to an 
independent board or commission.128  I am not sure this will happen, nor am I sure that it 
necessarily should: boards would mean greater delays in pardons, something which is not always 
good; boards might also mean fewer pardons, and more bureaucratic delay, as there might be 
disagreement about who ought to be pardoned or who should be pardoned first.  Executive power 
                                                          
124 One is reminded in this respect of the old adage that “consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.”   
125 See Nathanson, supra note 72 (arguing that the arbitrariness of the death penalty was a reason to oppose it).  
126 See especially the contribution of Ernest van den Haag in ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG AND JOHN P. CONRAD, THE 
DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE (1983) (arguing that the individual justice of executing one person was not affected at 
all by the fact that some escaped justice). 
127 Again, I am only dealing with the case of guilty people who are given an unjust penalty.  I think the calculus 
changes if we move to consider innocent people facing the death penalty.  Then, it seems to me that justice would 
require saving anyone you could, even if this could only be done on morally arbitrary grounds.   
128 See Drinan, Clemency in a Time of Crisis,  28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1123 (2012) 
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has always, historically, meant the power for quick action, whether for good or for bad.  I think 
pardoning is a place where quick action can often be desirable and necessary, and the best 
remedy.  Some of the delay in recent pardons is due to too many layers of review, too much 
bureaucracy, too many hands in the pot.   
 But if we are going to favor quick action, this means we need to be even clearer on the 
moral constraints that operate on the pardon power.  Nor does solving the question of who should 
pardon get us any clearer in specifying what the ground rules for pardoning should be.  Wherever 
the pardoning power resides, this paper has described an important additional moral check on 
that power.  The power should not be considered good or bad only in its individual instances, but 
also when we look at the pardons over time and as a whole.  That is, we should look at patterns, 
not just at cases -- because pardons can be wrong not just in individual instances, but also when 
we consider them in groups.   
More generally, this paper has proposed a framework for evaluating what we might call 
“discretionary acts of justice” throughout the criminal justice system, and not only in the 
executive.  Those acts, too, should be looked at in terms of whether they are, broadly speaking, 
consistent with an ideal theory of criminal justice.  Do they help us bring about that ideal, in a 
way that reflects the values of that ideal?  Or do they violate those values?  Actors within the 
criminal justice need to be mindful, not just of how they act in this or that case, but what legal 
virtues they display over time and across many cases.     
 
